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As firms continue to strive for a competitive advantage in a largely commoditized 
marketplace, it has become increasingly important to understand the role that the senses 
play in shaping consumer behavior. While vision has historically captivated the attention 
of researchers, emerging work focuses on the senses of smell, touch, taste, and sound. 
Within my dissertation, I focus on the interplay of cognition and sensory perception, 
addressing the impact of advertising on the sensory experience (Essay 1: “The Effects of 
Advertising Copy on Sensory Thoughts and Perceived Taste”), as well as how 
incorporating sensations within the advertisement can influence consumer behavior 
(Essay 2: “Mental Simulation and the ‘Visual Depiction Effect’: When Visual Stimuli 
Facilitate Sensory Experience”).  
I build from recent models of cognition which state that our perceptual 
experiences are utilized to form our cognitions. One key component of these cognitive 
models is that our initial perceptions, both conscious and nonconscious, are stored in 
memory and are simulated or played back upon subsequent encounters with not only the 
object itself, but also representations of that object, such as verbal and visual depictions. 




information in advertising on the consumption experience. More specifically, I show that 
advertisements that verbally depict multiple sensory experiences lead to better taste 
perceptions than advertisements that verbally depict only the taste sensory experience. In 
my second essay, I address the impact of vision on mental simulation of interacting with 
products, and consequent purchase intentions stemming from this mental simulation. 
Specifically, I show that way in which an object or product is visually depicted can 
facilitate mental simulation and thereby affect purchase intentions.  
The first part of my dissertation explores the ability of advertisements to elicit 
sensory related cognitions and ultimately affect sensory experience. I chose taste as the 
sensation of interest due to its multisensory nature, and therefore was exploring the 
impact of advertising on taste. Taste (or flavor) is comprised of inputs not only from the 
tongue, but from the other four senses as well (i.e., smell, sound, vision, touch). Across a 
series of three studies, I test whether advertisements incorporating these additional 
sensory experiences through verbal copy can lead to higher taste perceptions than 
advertisements focusing on purely taste sensations. Indeed, I find that the multisensory 
ads lead to more positive sensory thoughts during a consumption experience and 
ultimately result in higher evaluated taste of the products (studies 1 and 2). Since the 
effect of the advertisement is driven by differences in the cognitions generated, I show 
that inhibiting the ability to think by imposing cognitive load (requiring participants to 
memorize unrelated information during the presentation of the advertisements) reduces 
the effects of the multisensory advertisement on taste perceptions (study 3). The results of 
my studies exhibit that sensations are generated both from the perceptual properties of the 




studies show that advertising can have a significant impact not only on pre-purchase 
attitudes and purchase intentions, but also on the consumption experience itself.   
The second part of my dissertation focuses on the effects of visual product 
depictions within advertising to encourage mental simulation or interaction with the 
product. A recent body of literature within cognitive psychology holds that all thoughts 
are derived from the perceptual experiences we have with objects, with bodily states and 
mental simulations driving the creation of our cognitions. This research presents several 
testable hypotheses. If our brains mentally simulate interacting with products simply 
upon perception of the object (e.g., in visual form), then this simulated interaction should 
have similar consequences as actual interaction, specifically leading to higher purchase 
intentions when the simulation is facilitated. Across four studies I find that simply 
altering the way in which a product is depicted can lead to differences in behavioral 
intentions (studies 1-4). Additionally, due to the close link between cognition and 
perception and the resources each utilizes, I propose and show that blocking the ability to 
perceive inhibits the ability to mentally simulate this interaction with the product 
depicted. Indeed, I show that the effects of visual stimuli facilitating mental simulation 
are not only attenuated when the resources used for simulation are blocked, but can 
actually be reversed (study 2). In an additional study (study 3), I posit and find this 
simulation to be operative at a more automatic level than deliberate imagery, with 
differential consequences resulting from directions to imagine. Finally, I find that the 
effects of mental simulation are not globally positive, with negative consequences 




With my dissertation I contribute to the growing literature within cognitive 
psychology, and to an increasing extent, consumer behavior, examining the interplay 
between cognition and perception. I provide unique behavioral evidence for this 
connection both at a deliberate (essay 1) and more automatic (essay2) level. My 
contribution should facilitate additional exploration of this promising field.  
I begin my dissertation by presenting my first essay: “The Effects of Advertising 
Copy on Sensory Thoughts and Perceived Taste.” Following this essay I move to my 
second essay: “Mental Simulation and the “Visual Depiction Effect”: When Visual 
Stimuli Facilitate Sensory Experience.” I end with a brief conclusion which places my 






The Effects of Advertising Copy on Sensory Thoughts and Perceived Taste 
 
 
Food advertising is big business. Kraft Foods spent $1.5 billion in 2007 on 
advertising in the U.S. alone, whereas PepsiCo spent $1.31 billion, and McDonalds spent 
$1.14 billion (Advertising Age Data Center). The financial importance of this domain 
begs the question, how should one advertise for food? A quick glance at current ads 
shows the obvious: mention the taste of the food. This is expected since the ad is for food 
after all. The less obvious and consequently seldom used solution is to bring attention to 
the unique multisensory aspects of taste perception. In this research we suggest how and 
why multisensory advertising for food ads can enhance taste perceptions.  
In this article we explore whether other senses are so physiologically closely tied 
to taste that mentioning them will make no difference, and whether an ad in general can 
impact taste perceptions. By exploring if the ad can affect taste itself, we test an 
additional possible effect of the ad. While food advertising is typically used to spark 
interest in the food or an intention to buy it, it is not usually used for affecting taste 
perception. Further, if the ad does affect taste, then we are also suggesting that taste is 
affected by cognition and is not automatically incorporated into perceptions. Besides 




consumers’ thoughts about the food (how they change) when the ad is changed. We also 
examine if these thoughts drive the change in taste perception.  
This research has both theoretical and substantive implications. First, we show 
that ads can affect sensory perceptions, and that sensory thoughts mediate the effect of 
ads on perception. More specifically, we show that ads mentioning senses other than taste 
can increase positive sensory thoughts about the food and consequently taste. Second, we 
show that the processing of ads is deliberate and cognitive so that the enhancing effect of 
multiple-sense ads is reduced when cognitive resources are constrained. Our hypotheses 
are supported across three experiments. 
Our research has many practical implications for ad executives and managers 
since it can easily and readily be applied in directing ad copy for food products. In the 
rest of the article, we build our conceptual framework and hypotheses, elaborate on the 
experiments, and end with conclusions and ideas for future research.  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
One of the main focal points of this article is to explore the interaction of 
cognition and sensory perception, and in particular, taste. Taste is a curiously unique 
sensation, as it is comprised not only of one sensory input (i.e., from the tongue), but is 
also created by incorporating multiple sensory inputs. As such, taste is suggestible and 
ambiguous. We propose that in addition to a reliance on intrinsic cues from the food 




We begin our literature review with a brief overview of the neuroscience and 
physiology literature addressing the intrinsic, multisensory composition of taste. We then 
focus on the more critical dimension of taste perception to our research: the impact of 
extrinsic cues such as advertising.   
 
Effect of Intrinsic Cues on Taste Perception—What is Taste Perception?  
 
When we think of taste perception, we immediately think of sensations on the 
tongue. However, despite our seemingly constant exposure to food, we have remarkable 
difficulty in discerning one taste from another with just our taste buds. Part of this 
ineptitude stems from the limited number of distinct tastes that we can detect. Until 
recently, our taste buds were known to detect only sweet, sour, salty, and bitter tastes. A 
new taste, umami, discovered in 1909 (Ikeda 2002), only recently received 
neurophysiological support for its existence as a distinct taste receptor (Chaudhari, 
Landin, and Roper 2000). Unfortunately, even with the addition of this fifth taste, it is 
still difficult to accurately judge the complex sensation of taste. However, taste is not 
physiologically comprised of sensations from taste buds only, but also relies heavily on 
input from the other senses.  
Imagine eating a handful of popcorn. It is impossible to simply focus on the 
sensations of your tongue. Don’t the mouth-watering smell of the butter, the feel of the 
popcorn in your hands and mouth, the popcorn’s warmth, the way it sounds when you 
chew it, as well as its visual appearance, all lead to an overall multisensory taste 




recently received neurophysiological support (Rolls 2005; Small and Jones-Gotman 
2001). Rolls (2005) shows that the pure effects of gustatory stimuli are represented in the 
primary taste cortex (frontal operculum/insula), whereas the convergence of multiple 
sensory inputs used to represent taste occurs in part of the orbitofrontal cortex, referred to 
as the secondary taste cortex (Rolls 2005).  
The primary accompanying sense for taste is olfaction, or how the food smells 
(Small and Prescott 2005). In fact, smell impacts taste both before (orthonasal) and after 
(retronasal) food enters our mouth (Rozin 1982). Smell plays such an integral role in taste 
perception that without it, it is difficult to distinguish a potato from an apple, or wine 
from apple juice (Herz 2007). The intrinsic visual appearance of the food also contributes 
to the sense of taste in generating expectations and perceptions of flavor (Dubose, 
Cardello, and Maller 1980) and can ultimately dominate gustatory cues altogether (Hoegg 
and Alba 2007). The sound the food makes when bitten plays a key role in taste 
perceptions for certain food items (e.g., potato chips, celery, crackers), impacting 
perceived freshness as well as quality (Zampini and Spence 2004). Relatedly, the texture 
(de Araujo and Rolls 2004) and temperature of food can affect taste. Recent research has 
shown that temperature sensations on the tongue are directly related to taste. Specifically, 
warming the tongue elicits sweet and bitter tastes, whereas cooling the tongue leads to 
sour and salty taste perceptions (Cruz and Green 2000).  
It is thus evident from the physiology and neuroscience literature that taste is 
derived from multiple intrinsic sensory components, including smell, vision, sound, and 
touch (including texture and temperature). However, the automaticity of these inputs is 




these cues will impact taste perceptions. This question addresses the automaticity of 
intrinsic cues, as well as the general impact of extrinsic cues, such as advertising, on taste 
perceptions. We next focus on relevant literature within consumer behavior and 
psychology addressing the impact of extrinsic cues on taste perceptions, and formally 
present our hypotheses.  
   
Effect of Extrinsic Cues on Taste Perception  
 
Let us distinguish first between a more deliberate top-down process for taste 
perception versus a more automatic bottom-up process. Top-down processing holds that 
external information provided about the food is processed more deliberately, and that it 
affects taste perception in a cognitive manner, whereas bottom-up processing would 
suggest that information about the food is processed more automatically and heuristically, 
driven by inherent aspects of the stimulus such as the intrinsic cues discussed earlier 
(Smith and Kosslyn 2007). Sometimes it is questionable which process is working. Also, 
both processes may operate simultaneously and interact with one another. One instance 
where top-down processes have a large impact on perceptions is with ambiguous or 
suggestible experiences (Hoch and Ha 1986). Within the present context, the ambiguity 
of a taste experience would then lead to more susceptibility to, and increased utilization 
of external influences in forming overall taste perceptions. We look at such outside 
influences both in more bottom-up and more top-down processing contexts. 
Research examining more automatic, bottom-up processing effects in taste 




of labeling a food item as either healthy or unhealthy. The authors receive support for an 
unhealthy equals tasty intuition that consumers hold, whereby food categorized as 
unhealthy results in higher taste perceptions than food categorized as healthy. They 
provide support for an automatic, bottom-up process by showing that in an implicit 
association test (IAT), individuals are quicker to categorize unhealthy (vs. healthy) foods 
as tasty. Krishna and Morrin (2008) demonstrate the automatic effect of another extrinsic 
cue, product haptics, on taste perception. In multiple experiments, they show that the 
haptic quality of glasses from which water and other drinks are consumed can affect taste 
perception. They argue that the haptic effect on taste is automatic and that more 
deliberate processing would make people realize that the containers are non-diagnostic 
for taste and should not affect their perception. Thus, even extrinsic cues can operate in a 
more automatic manner in influencing taste perceptions.  
Moving to more controlled top-down processing, which is the proposed 
mechanism for the effects in the present research, Allison and Uhl (1964) explore the 
impact of brand name on subsequent taste preferences. The authors administer a blind 
taste test of beers (by removing identifying labels) to experienced beer drinkers and find 
that participants cannot correctly discriminate between the beers. However, when the 
beers are labeled, the participants rate their favorite beer higher than the others. This 
would be considered top-down deliberate processing with people linking their preferred 
brand name with the better tasting beer. Lee, Frederick, and Ariely (2006) additionally 
show that such extrinsic cues not only alter preferences among beers, but can change 
one’s taste experience altogether. In their studies, the stated ingredients (whether the beer 




that the specific verbalization of fat amount in meat (e.g., 75% lean or 25% fat) affects 
the perceived leanness and taste of the meat. Recently, Hoegg and Alba (2007) show the 
impact of several extrinsic cues for orange juice, including brand name, price, and region 
of origin on taste discrimination and taste preference. Their findings include a national 
brand receiving better taste evaluations than a store brand, and differences in the color of 
orange juice leading to greater perceived taste differences than differences in brand 
labels. This could again be top-down processing with people expecting, for instance, that 
a national brand uses better oranges and should have better orange juice.  
Top-down deliberate processing of ads, with the ad content affecting initial 
perceptions, has been shown in prior research comparing verbal and visual ads. 
Famously, Mitchell and Olson (1981) show that a verbal ad (Brand I Facial tissues are 
soft) results in the tissues being perceived to be less soft than a visual ad (picture of a 
kitten). Edell and Staelin (1983, 46) suggest that the verbal message of the ad is 
processed more cognitively and can guide the processing of the picture contained within 
the ad. Our research contributes to prior research on the impact of cognitions on 
consumer behavior, in that we are subjecting participants to an actual consumption 
experience where they will evaluate a sensation. In prior research such as Mitchell and 
Olson (1981) and Edell and Staelin (1983), subjects simply judged the product by looking 
at the ad. Nonetheless, this research suggests that the content of ads can be processed 
cognitively and could affect taste perception by framing the overall experience. 
Prior research also demonstrates that the ad can guide the types of thoughts 
generated. Using verbal protocols, Edell and Staelin (1983) find that an objective ad (e.g., 




than a subjective ad (car drives well on snow). For food ads, a multiple-sense ad should 
direct sensory thoughts which can be about all five senses to be more positive compared 
to the single-sense ad which focuses on taste alone. The ad can explicitly mention the 
niceties of all five senses. However, even if it does not—for instance, if we consider just 
an ad slogan like “taste is all 5 senses”—the mere fact that the ad is mentioning all five 
senses is suggestive that the food rates high on all five senses; therefore the ad should 
direct thoughts for all sensory modalities to be positive.  
The literature presented on the effect of extrinsic cues on taste perception should 
work in concert with the literature on the physiological composition of taste. We propose 
that the cognitions generated by an extrinsic cue, such as an ad, will impact sensations 
and ultimately affect taste perceptions. As taste is composed of all five senses, thoughts 
about all five senses should affect taste. Ads mentioning all five senses would be more 
likely to direct thoughts about these senses to be positive compared to ads which talk 
about taste alone. Additionally, perceived taste should be better the more positive sensory 
thoughts one has, and be worse the more negative sensory thoughts one has. Hence, the 
surplus of positive over negative thoughts should drive taste perception.  
With the effects depending largely on thought generation and cognition, we 
anticipate the availability of cognitive resources to impact the ad taste effects. 
Specifically, with top-down or largely cognitive processing, the introduction of cognitive 
load should distract attention away from the ad (Nowlis and Shiv 2005; Shiv and Nowlis 
2004) and attenuate the effect that the ad has on taste perceptions. 




H1:  Perceived taste for food will be better with ads that mention multiple 
senses (multiple-sense ads) compared to ads that mention taste alone 
(single-sense ads).  
H2a:  There will be more positive sensory thoughts with a multiple- versus a 
single-sense ad.  
H2b:  The number of positive minus negative sensory thoughts will mediate the 
effect of ad on perceived taste. 
H3:  Cognitive load will reduce the effect of a multiple-sense versus single-
sense ad on the number of positive thoughts for food and on taste 
perceptions. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about Here] 
 
Figure 2.1 represents the conceptual framework supported across our studies. We 
test our set of hypotheses in a series of three experiments, using different foods as stimuli 
(chewing gum, potato chips, and popcorn) to test for the robustness of our results. 
 
Study 1: Ad Slogan, Sensory Thoughts, and Taste 
 
In this study, we test if multiple-sense ads result in higher perceived taste 
compared to single-sense ads (hypothesis 1), more positive thoughts compared to single-
sense ads (hypothesis 2a), and if sensory thoughts mediate the effect of ads on perceived 




simple ad slogans, with one focusing explicitly on taste (“Long Lasting Flavor”) and the 
other on the general sensory experience (“Stimulate Your Senses”). We posit that even at 
this very general level, drawing attention to sensory experiences beyond taste will result 




Pre-test.  Pre-tests were conducted with 27 participants recruited from a business 
school lounge. Each participant filled out a brief questionnaire which contained one of 
two ad slogans. One questionnaire contained the multiple-sense slogan (Stimulate Your 
Senses), whereas the other contained the single-sense slogan (Long Lasting Flavor). 
Participants were asked to give their overall evaluations of the slogans on three separate 
dimensions (1 to 7 scales anchored at 1=bad/unfavorable/dislike, and 
7=good/favorable/like). These three items were combined to form the attitude toward the 
ad scale (  .94; Mitchell and Olson 1981). We then compared the means of the scale 
for both slogans and found no significant difference (Mmultiple = 4.90, n = 13, Msingle = 
4.73, n = 14), (p > .5). It should also be noted that the number of words in the multiple- 
and single-sense slogans were intentionally kept the same. 
 
Design and Procedure.  Fifty-four undergraduates participated in groups with a 
maximum size of 10 in exchange for course credit. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the two conditions (single-sense ad or multiple-sense ad), placed in 




A food distributor has recently created a new line of chewing gum which is being 
test marketed in several areas across the country. You will have the opportunity of 
trying this gum today. Below is the tagline for the gum: 
Participants then read one of the two slogans and were told to ask the 
experimenter for the piece of gum when done reading. The gum was the peppermint 
flavor of Wrigley’s Extra brand, served to the participants on a plate with the packaging 
removed. Before turning the page to answer the questions, participants were instructed to 
chew the gum. Then, while chewing, participants were asked to write down any thoughts 
that came to their mind. Note that the multiple-sense slogan did not list any specific 
senses that would be readily available to participants when listing their thoughts. 
Following the thought listing section, participants rated the taste of the gum on a seven-
point scale (1=very poor taste, 7=very good taste). Upon completion of the questionnaire, 
participants were given a debriefing report and were dismissed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Results.  An ANOVA on taste perceptions revealed the hypothesized effect of 
single- versus multiple-sense slogans on perceived taste (Mmultiple = 5.39, Msingle = 4.77), 
(F(1, 52) = 6.60, p < .05), with the slogan, “Stimulate Your Senses” leading to higher 
taste perceptions than “Long Lasting Flavor.”  This result provides support for hypothesis 





Participants’ thoughts were coded for valence as positive (e.g., “It’s good and 
flavorful”), negative (e.g., “I don’t really like the flavor”), and neutral (e.g., “It’s minty”). 
The thoughts were further coded by content as being primarily sensory (e.g., “I like the 
texture”), brand-related (e.g., “I prefer Orbit gum”), or slogan related (e.g., “Not very 
stimulating”). Thoughts were rated by two independent coders and inter-coder reliability 
was 91.3%; disagreements were resolved through discussion. Table 1 presents the 
average number of thoughts by condition.  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 
Participants listed a few thoughts on the slogan (.04 per subject for both single- 
and multiple-sense ads), and the brand (0.19 and 0.18 per subject for the single- and 
multiple-sense slogans, respectively), but the vast majority of listed thoughts were 
sensory in nature (1.81 and 2.64, for the single- and multiple-sense slogans, respectively). 
The mean number of total sensory thoughts was significantly higher for the multiple-
sense slogan (M = 2.64) than for the single-sense slogan (M = 1.81), (F(1, 52) = 5.66, p < 
.05). Within the total sensory thoughts, there were also more positive thoughts in the 
multiple-sense condition than in the single-sense condition (Mmultiple = 1.82, Msingle = .92), 
(F(1, 52) = 7.65, p < .01), supporting hypothesis 2a. Proportionally, most of the sensory 
thoughts were positive, and there was a significantly higher proportion of positive 
sensory thoughts in the multiple- (69%) versus single-sense (51%) conditions (z = 1.97, p 
< .05). There were no significant differences between negative and neutral proportions. 




vision and feel (haptics) for the multiple-sense versus single-sense ad. We are most 
interested, however, in the balance of positive over negative sensory thoughts. This 
measure captures the overall valence of the participant’s sensory thoughts, which we 
anticipate drives the effect of the slogan on taste perceptions. Number and type of 
cognitive verbal responses have also been used in earlier research as measures of process 
(Cacioppo and Petty 1981). Consistent with this reasoning, we find that the net thoughts 
are significantly more positive in the multiple-sense slogan condition than in the single-
sense slogan condition (1.29 vs. 0.38), (F(1, 52) = 4.75, p < .05). 
Mediation tests involved additional analyses to determine if the effect of the 
slogan on taste perceptions was mediated by the number of net positive sensory thoughts. 
The first criterion of mediation was met (Baron and Kenny 1986), as the ANOVA 
reported earlier shows a significant effect of slogan on perceived taste (F(1, 52) = 6.60, p 
< .05). We also received support for the second criterion of mediation by showing a 
significant relationship between the slogan condition and net positive sensory thoughts 
(F(1, 52) = 4.75, p < .05). An ANCOVA run with perceived taste as the dependent 
variable, slogan as the independent variable, and net positive sensory thoughts as the 
covariate provides support for the third criterion of mediation. The initial significant main 
effect of slogan on perceived taste is now only marginally significant (F(1, 51) = 3.15, p 
=.082); whereas the net number of positive sensory thoughts has a significant effect on 
perceived taste (F(1, 51) = 8.94, p < .01). As indicated by the Sobel (1982) test (z = 1.8, p 
< .08), these results are suggestive of the net positive sensory thoughts mediating the 





Discussion.  In study 1, we obtain support for hypothesis 1 finding that multiple-
sense ads result in better taste perception versus single-sense ads. Multiple-sense ads also 
result in significantly more net positive sensory thoughts than single-sense ads, 
supporting hypothesis 2a. Further, the number of net positive sensory thoughts mediates 
the effects of the slogan on taste perceptions, supporting hypothesis 2b. Study 2 addresses 
two limitations of study 1, namely, the single-item dependent variable, and the general 
ambiguity of the slogans used in study 1, which could affect the perceived amount of 
informativeness contained in the slogans. Addressing these limitations will help to more 
fully explicate the theoretical and practical implications of our research. In study 2 we 
also use potato chips to test the robustness of the effects obtained in study 1. 
 
Study 2: Ad, Sensory Thoughts, and Taste 
 
We created two ads for study 2. One of these ads described different sensory 
experiences (taste, smell, texture) when eating potato chips, whereas the other ad 
described an equal number of taste experiences when eating potato chips. The single-
sense (multiple-sense) ad read: 
Our potato chips deliver the taste you crave. From the first bite you’ll savor the 
rich barbecue flavor (smell) and enjoy the delicious salty taste (crunchy texture) - 
our potato chips are the perfect choice for all your snacking. 
To further ensure that the multiple-sense did not have more perceived information 







Pre-test.  The two ads were pre-tested on complexity and informativeness, as well 
as on other standard attitude toward the ad measures. The pre-tests were conducted with 
46 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory marketing course and employed a 
between subjects design. After reading the ad, participants answered a series of questions 
regarding their opinions and attitudes toward the ad. Participants rated the degree to 
which they agreed or disagreed with two statements about the ad (the ad was: 
informative/complex; 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). We also captured overall 
evaluations of the ads on three separate dimensions (1 to 7 scales anchored at 
1=bad/unfavorable/dislike, and 7=good/favorable/like; Mitchell and Olson 1981). These 
three items were combined to form an attitude toward the ad scale (  .83).  
Evaluations of the ads did not differ across the three dimensions (all p > .35). 
Particularly, the ads were perceived equal on informativeness (Msingle = 4.61, Mmultiple = 
4.74), (p > .5), complexity (Msingle = 2.91, Mmultiple = 2.57), (p > .35), and overall attitude 
toward the ad (p > .5). 
 
Design and Procedure.  The experiment used a one-factor between-subjects 
design, with the ad (multiple- or single-sense) serving as the manipulated factor. We 
chose barbecue flavored, kettle-cooked potato chips to be the food eaten during the 
experiment. Ninety-two undergraduate students participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit and in groups with a maximum size of 10. Participants were first introduced 




ads and products that either currently exist on the market or are in a testing phase. 
Participants then read the ad for the potato chips. Upon reading the ad, participants were 
instructed to raise their hands to ask the experimenter for the potato chips. The 
experimenter then placed a plain white cup of chips with a napkin in front of the 
participant. Participants then ate the chips before moving on in the questionnaire. All 
instructions were contained in the questionnaire, including when to ask the experimenter 
for the food item, and were thus self-paced.  
  
Measures.  Participants began the questionnaire by listing any thoughts they had 
while eating the chips. Then they were asked to evaluate the chips on three dimensions: 
the overall quality (1=very poor quality, 9=very good quality), the overall taste (1=very 
poor taste, 9=very good taste), and how delicious the potato chips were (1=not at all 
delicious, 9=very delicious).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Results.  We conducted an ANOVA with the three taste measures combined into 
one scale as the dependent measure (  .92), and ad as the independent variable. We 
found support for the hypothesized effect of ad on taste (hypothesis 1), with the multiple-
sense ad leading to significantly higher taste perceptions than the single-sense ad (Mmultiple 
= 6.78, Msingle = 5.67), (F(1, 90) = 9.56, p < .005).  
We posited that sensory thoughts would mediate the effects of ad on taste 




study 1. Again we find more positive sensory thoughts in the multiple-sense condition (M 
= 1.98) than in the single-sense condition (M = 1.25), (F(1, 90) = 8.90, p < .005), 
supporting hypothesis 2a. The proportion of the positive sensory thoughts was again 
significantly greater in the multiple- (68%) versus single-sense (40%) conditions (z = 
4.49, p < .01). In addition, the net positive sensory thoughts were greater in the multiple-
sense condition (M = 1.70) than in the single-sense condition (M = 0.29), (F(1, 90) = 
20.44, p < .001). We conducted additional analyses to check for mediation. As reported, 
the first two criteria for mediation were met, with the ad having a significant effect on 
both taste perceptions and net positive sensory thoughts. An ANCOVA was run to check 
for the third criterion of mediation, with perceived taste as the dependent variable, ad as 
the independent variable, and net positive sensory thoughts as the covariate. The initial 
significant impact of ad on taste perceptions is no longer significant (F(1, 89) = .17 p > 
.5), while the net number of positive sensory thoughts has a significant effect on 
perceived taste (F(1, 89) = 50.81, p < .001). Thus net positive sensory thoughts again 
mediate the effect of ad on taste perceptions as indicated by the Sobel (1982) test (z = 2.8, 
p < .01). These results add support further to hypothesis 2b. 
  
Discussion.  The findings of study 2 provide corroborating support for the process 
involved in the effect of advertising on taste perceptions. The multiple-sense ad was 
effective in generating more positive sensory thoughts and better taste perceptions, 
supporting hypotheses 1 and hypothesis 2a. Further, the number of net positive sensory 
thoughts was found to mediate the effects of the ads on taste perceptions, supporting 




A remaining question, however, is to what extent these sensory effects depend on 
effortful, deliberative processing. The effectiveness of the ads in the prior studies was 
mediated by sensory cognitions. Therefore, would the effects of the ads obtain if 
participants were limited in their cognitive capacity? In study 3, we address any 
moderating role of cognitive load on the ad-taste effect. 
 
Study 3: Cognitive Load as a Moderator of the Ad-Taste Effect 
 
The effects of ads on taste perceptions in the prior studies are mediated by sensory 
thoughts. These results are consistent with our theoretical framework that the effects are 
largely cognitive or top-down in nature. Therefore, we anticipate the introduction of 
cognitive load to attenuate our effects, leading to less dissimilar taste perceptions across 
ad conditions (hypothesis 3). Put another way, we are arguing that the multiple-sense ad 
(vs. a single-sense ad) has a smaller effect on enhancing taste perceptions under cognitive 
load.  
Initially, this hypothesis may seem at odds with results from recent research on in-
store sampling and distraction (Nowlis and Shiv 2005; Shiv and Nowlis 2004). The main 
findings across these articles is that distracting consumers (imposing cognitive load) 
while taste testing will lead to a heightened focus on the affective experience versus any 
informational input; this increases the subsequent likelihood of choosing a more affective 
product from a set of products (e.g., milk chocolate vs. soy chocolate) and also increases 
consumption pleasure. At a superficial level, we seem to be arguing that load will 




However, note that while ads are informational, the ads in our experiments lead to 
affective (sensory) thoughts, so distraction from the ad is a distraction from affective 
consequences. As the results from our prior two studies show, the multiple-sense ads we 
employ lead to affectively valenced consequences (i.e., more positive sensory thoughts 
and heightened taste perceptions). Hence, we argue that a distraction from the ads will 




Design.  A 2 (ad: multiple-sense or single-sense) x 2 (cognitive load: yes or no) 
between subjects full factorial design was used in study 3. One hundred and twelve 
undergraduates participated in the experiment as part of a subject pool. We used popcorn 
as the food product in this study. The brand name for the popcorn, Emerald Aisle, was 
fictitious in order to limit confounds related to prior brand exposure. The ads below were 
used to describe the popcorn in the single-sense (multiple-sense) conditions: 
Emerald Aisle popcorn delivers the taste (smell) of a movie theater in your own 
home. You’ll taste (see) the perfect amount of butter and salt in every handful. 
With its delicious, buttery flavor (texture) and a taste that dances on your tongue 
(crunch that’s music to your ears), Emerald Aisle popcorn is the perfect choice 
for all your snacking. 
 
Pre-test.  The two ads were pre-tested on 40 participants to ensure equivalence in 




informativeness, and complexity, as in the prior pre-tests. A comparison of the means 
across ads showed no difference for any of the measures (all p > .5). 
 
Procedure.  Participants completed the study in groups with an upper limit of 10 
people. Before being given the ad, participants in the load condition were given a 
separate task. In this task, participants were given a sheet which contained the roster for a 
fifth grade class. They were instructed to remember which first name went with which 
last name. Similar tasks have been shown to be cognitively taxing in earlier research 
(Gilbert, Giesler, and Morris 1995; Gilbert and Hixon 1991). Participants were given one 
minute to examine the class roster and then moved to the next questionnaire which 
contained the popcorn ad (participants in the no load condition moved directly to the 
popcorn questionnaire). To be consistent with the cover story for imposing cognitive 
load, participants were given a memory test after they completed the questionnaire 
related to the ad. This test asked two questions on the names of students in the fifth grade 
class (e.g., What is Jay’s last name?”).   
The popcorn used was the private-label brand from a local grocery store. Each 
participant was handed a napkin and a white plastic cup half-full of popcorn. The cups of 
popcorn were prepared before each experimental session, and participants were not 
exposed to the packaging. Each participant was instructed to eat the popcorn first before 
moving on to answer the questions. The first question given to participants was to list any 
thoughts they had while eating the popcorn. Participants then answered questions 
regarding their perceptions of the taste of the popcorn. Similar to study 2, participants 




(1=very poor quality, 7=very good quality), and deliciousness (1=not at all delicious, 
7=very delicious) of the popcorn. These items were combined to form a three-item scale 
measuring taste perceptions ( = .90). After completing the questionnaire, participants in 
the cognitive load condition were given the memory test questions. Participants were also 
given the opportunity to report any suspicions they had regarding the purpose of the 
study. No participant correctly guessed or showed insight into the experimental 
hypotheses.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We conducted an ANOVA with taste perception as the dependent variable and ad 
and cognitive load as independent variables. There was a significant main effect of ad on 
taste perceptions with the multiple-sense ad leading to higher taste perceptions than the 
single-sense ad (Mmultiple = 4.14 vs. Msingle = 3.63), (F(1, 108) = 6.39, p < .05), adding 
further support to hypothesis 1. This main effect was qualified by the hypothesized two-
way interaction of load and ad on overall taste perception (F(1, 108) = 7.79, p < .01). The 
main effect of load was not significant (p > .15). Figure 2 graphically presents the cell 
means of taste perceptions by condition. 
  
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
Simple effect tests revealed a significant difference between the multiple- and 




13.60, p < .01), with taste perceptions in the multiple-sense ad condition being 
significantly higher; however, there was no significant difference between the multiple- 
and single-sense ads in the load condition (p > .8). This is consistent with hypothesis 3. 
Additional simple effect tests revealed a significant difference between the load 
and no load conditions when subjects were exposed to the multiple-sense ad (Mload = 
3.73, Mno load = 4.67), (t(108) = 2.92, p < .01), with taste in the no load condition being 
significantly higher. Simple effect tests also show that the effect of the single-sense ad on 
perceived taste is not significantly different across the two load conditions (Mload = 3.79 
Mno load = 3.48), (t(108) = 1.00, p > .3).  
We also conducted an ANOVA with net positive sensory thoughts as the 
dependent variable and ad and load as the independent variables. Thoughts followed a 
similar pattern to taste perceptions, such that there was a significant main effect of ad 
with the multiple-sense ad leading to more net positive thoughts than the single-sense ad 
(Mmultiple = 0.25 vs. Msingle = -0.39), (F(1, 108) = 4.80, p < .05). This main effect was also 
qualified by the hypothesized two-way interaction of ad and load (F(1, 108) = 4.16, p < 
.05).  
As in prior studies, we wanted to determine if net positive sensory thoughts 
mediate the relationship between the independent variables (ad and load) and the 
dependent variable (taste perceptions). As already shown, the first two criteria of 
mediation are met, as the interaction of ad and load on taste perceptions was significant, 
and the interaction of ad and load on net positive sensory thoughts was also significant. 
We conducted an ANCOVA to check for the final criterion of mediation with ad and load 




perceptions as the dependent variable. The prior significant interaction of ad and load on 
taste perceptions is no longer significant (p = NS), whereas the net positive sensory 
thoughts are significant (F(1, 108) = 42.03, p < .001) A Sobel (1982) test conducted 
supports mediation (z = 1.95, p = .05), again adding support to hypothesis 2b. 
The results of study 3 add further support to our hypotheses, and also establish 
potential boundary conditions for our effects. Taste perceptions differed between single- 
and multiple-sense ad conditions only when cognitive resources were available. That is, 
when participants could appropriate an ample amount of cognitive resources to the 
multiple-sense ad, the overall taste perception was better than in the single-sense 
condition. In the condition where cognitive resources were constrained, there was no 
difference in perceived taste between the multiple- and single-sense ads. This experiment 
further demonstrates the cognitive nature of the effects and contributes theoretically by 
showing that the effect of distraction during a consumption experience may be contingent 




Research on sensory perception within marketing has largely focused on the study 
of vision (Krishna 2007 for a review), with the other senses receiving scattered attention; 
however, this attention is intensifying (Peck and Childers 2008 for a review). A primary 
objective of this article is to contribute to the growing literature on sensory perception 
within marketing in showing that advertising copy for a food product can affect resulting 




of three studies, we show that multiple- versus single-sense ads lead to heightened taste 
perceptions, within some boundary conditions.  
With study 1 (chewing gum), we showed that a simple slogan could affect taste 
perceptions. Specifically, we showed that a multiple-sense slogan lead to higher taste 
perceptions than a single-sense slogan. Study 2 (potato chips) replicated and extended 
these results by showing the effect of verbal sensory advertising on taste perceptions. 
Study 3 (popcorn) further explicated the deliberate, top-down nature of our results, 
showing that the effect of the ad on taste perceptions is moderated by cognitive resource 
availability. Further, studies 1-3 show the mediating effect of net positive sensory 
thoughts on perceived taste. 
Our research makes important contributions to both the consumer behavior and 
sensory perception literatures. Our contribution to marketing is an explication of the 
effects of ads on taste perception. This extends the impact of advertising beyond typical 
evaluation variables such as awareness and purchase intentions. We demonstrate that ads 
(for food) can have a significant impact on perceived taste. We also contribute to 
perception research by providing evidence for the impact of verbal stimuli on sensory 
evaluations. Lastly, we make an attempt to bridge the gap between physiology and 
neuroscience and consumer behavior, showing promising potential for future research.  
The impact of cognition on perception warrants further attention and provides a 
fruitful arena for future research. We specifically focused on the cognitive impact of the 
extrinsic cue of advertising on sensory perception, but thoughts generated by other 
extrinsic cues could be equally as intriguing. Relevant neuroscience literature has shown 




the smell itself by inhibiting activation of smell areas in the brain for unpleasant smells 
(De Araujo et al. 2005). Should these processes occur in a more deliberative manner as 
shown across our studies, we may gain valuable insight into the effects of cognitions on 
perceptions through behavioral methodologies as well. Further, in our studies the stimuli 
used were generally pleasant, leading to congruence between the advertisement and 
consumption experience. However, should there be marked incongruity between the 
extrinsic cue and the consumption experience, one could explore the potential dominance 
of cognitions over sensory perceptions or vice versa. Our cognitions shape our 
experiences in a top-down manner, but the bottom-up influences of perceptions obviously 
play a role as well. This interaction of both cognition and sensory perception warrants 
future attention.  
With our research we chose to focus on the deliberate, cognitive determinants of 
sensory perceptions; however, future research could also address ways to affect these 
perceptions below consciousness, as much of what we do and perceive is driven by 
automatic processes (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). For example, it is possible that visual 
stimuli are processed more automatically than verbal stimuli in an advertising context, 
and could affect taste perceptions even under cognitive constraint. Indeed, pictures of 
food lead to similar neural activation patterns in the orbitofrontal cortex as verbal 
descriptions, and additionally activate areas associated with reward (Simmons, Martin, 
and Barsalou 2005). Therefore, it would be worthwhile to explore the impact of pictures 
used in isolation of verbal framing on sensory perceptions.  
Managerial implications of this research follow directly from our results. Despite 




within the food and beverage industry rarely addresses perceptions beyond taste. The 
results from our studies suggest that advertising should include multiple sensory 
attributes of the products as this has a significant impact on perceptions of the product. 
These findings are particularly relevant for the food industry, including packaged goods 
and restaurants, as they continue to spend billions of dollars in advertising the taste of 




TABLE 2.1: GUM THOUGHT MEANS BY SLOGAN CONDITION—STUDY 1 
 
 
Condition Multiple-Sense Single-Sense Total 
Positive minus negative 1.29 0.38 0.85 
Total sensory 2.64 1.81 2.24 
Positive 1.82 0.92 1.39 
Negative 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Neutral 0.29 0.42 0.35 
Taste 1.46 1.08 1.28 
Smell 0.5 0.31 0.41 
Sight 0.18 0.08 0.13 
Texture 0.5 0.35 0.43 
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Mental Simulation and the “Visual Depiction Effect”: When Visual Stimuli 
Facilitate Sensory Experience  
 
For years marketers have included instructions for consumers to imagine using 
their product. Slogans like “Imagine the Possibilities” from Intel and Apple, or simply 
“Imagine” from Samsung, encourage consumers to transport themselves into a state 
where they are using the product. The success of such appeals has been well documented 
within the consumer behavior literature (e.g., Bone and Ellen 1992; Gregory, Cialdini, 
and Carpenter 1982; MacInnis and Price 1987; McGill and Anand, 1989; Petrova and 
Cialdini 2005, 2008). But what causes us to imagine using the product in the absence of 
such pleas? Can just the way in which a product is visually depicted affect whether or not 
we imagine using the product? Is this something the advertiser should give attention to? 
Within this paper we build on recent models of cognition and perception to show that by 
including an instrument for product usage, or altering the way a product is visually 
depicted can elicit a simulation of sensory experience, with consequences on behavioral 
intentions. 
Why should visual product depiction affect the playback of sensory experiences? 




ringing sound of one’s alarm clock, to the smell of another’s perfume, to the act of eating 
a deliciously decadent piece of chocolate cake, one’s senses are constantly engaged. 
These sensory experiences are not simply perceived and dismissed, but are coded and 
stored in our brains neurally in the modality in which they were perceived (Barsalou 
1999, 2008). Ultimately, these sensory experiences are utilized to represent conceptual 
knowledge of objects, events, and even ideas. This link between our sensory experiences 
and cognition forms the theoretical base of recent models of grounded cognition 
(Barsalou 1999, 2008; Gibbs 2006; Wilson 2002). Specifically, the theory holds that our 
bodily states, actions, and even mental simulations are used to generate our cognitive 
activity (Barsalou 2008).  
One of the more prominent findings within this literature is the effect of bodily 
states on persuasion. For instance, Wells and Petty (1980) had participants either nod 
their head up and down or shake their head from side to side while hearing an editorial 
message. The researchers find that nodding one’s head up and down (vs. side to side) led 
to increased persuasion of the message. Additionally, participants holding a pen between 
their teeth (facilitating the muscles used during smiling) evaluated funny cartoons to be 
funnier than when holding a pen between their lips (limiting the use of muscles used 
during smiling; Strack, Martin, and Stepper 1988). Participants also evaluated novel 
Chinese ideographs more favorably when their arms were flexed versus extended 
(Cacioppo, Priester, Berntson 1993).  
More recent research supporting the concept of embodied cognition has focused 
on metaphorical transfers of meanings. For example, participants rated hypothetical 




held a warm (vs. cold) cup of coffee (Williams and Bargh 2008). In an opposite causal 
direction, participants who felt socially excluded were prone to rate the temperature of 
the experimental room as colder than those who did not feel socially excluded (Zhong 
and Leonardelli 2008).  
Despite the recent interest in embodied cognition, bodily states are only one of the 
ways in which cognition is grounded (Barsalou 2008). Mental simulation, or the 
reenactment of perceptual experiences, is another way in which cognition is grounded 
and is the focus of the present research. By mental simulation, we are referring to a more 
automatic form of mental imagery that is initiated by exposure to verbal or visual 
representations of objects. Specifically, we show that the way an object is visually 
depicted can facilitate mental simulation of interacting with the product, with significant 
consequences on behavioral intentions. We propose that visual depictions that lead to 
more (vs. less) mental simulation will result in higher (vs. lower) purchase intentions for 
the item depicted. Across a series of four studies we provide support for this primary 
hypothesis, while additionally explicating the process involved.  
In the first set of studies (studies 1a and 1b), we show that visual stimuli can 
facilitate simulated interaction with the product depicted, which leads to heightened 
purchase intentions. In our second study, occupying the perceptual resources required for 
simulation is shown to impact the visual depiction effect. Our third study contrasts our 
effects with more directed forms of imagery. Finally, with our fourth study we explore 
the visual depiction effect for negatively valenced stimuli.  
We begin by establishing the theoretical foundation for our hypothesized effects, 




Four experiments follow which test these hypotheses. We conclude by addressing 





The theory of grounded cognition—as related to mental simulation—posits that 
our initial perceptions of objects, both conscious and nonconscious, are stored in memory 
and are simulated or played back upon subsequent encounters with not only the object 
itself, but also representations of that object, such as verbal and visual depictions. For 
example, when we eat a chocolate, the brain encodes and integrates all of the different 
sensory perceptions related to the chocolate (e.g., how it looks, what it feels like when 
you bite into it, what it tastes like on your tongue). When we later produce knowledge of 
chocolate, we mentally simulate prior perceptions associated with the chocolate, leading 
to neural activation of many of the same sensory regions of the brain active during 
perception (Barsalou 2008). Several neuroimaging studies corroborate this proposition, as 
conceptual processing of sensory perceptions leads to neural activation of corresponding 
regions of the brain. For example, imagining the music of Beethoven leads to activation 
of the auditory cortex (Zatorre and Halpern 2005), passively reading words like 
“cinnamon” or “garlic” leads to neural activity in the primary olfactory cortex (Gonzalez 
et al. 2006), and viewing images of chocolate chip cookies activates the primary (frontal 
operculum/insula) and secondary (orbitofrontal cortex; Rolls 2005) taste cortices 




This playback of prior sensory experiences is similar to the construct of imagery 
within cognitive psychology and consumer behavior. However, the distinction within the 
grounded cognition literature between imagery and mental simulation focuses on the 
level of deliberation and conscious thought required. Specifically, “whereas mental 
imagery typically results from deliberate attempts to construct conscious representations 
in working memory, other forms of simulation often appear to become active 
automatically and unconsciously outside working memory (Barsalou 2008, 619).” Our 





One of the more intriguing consequences of the perception-cognition connection 
is that what we see visually is used to prepare our motor responses (Jeannerod 2001), that 
is, we draw upon our knowledge of prior interactions to simulate interaction with present 
stimuli. If the visual depiction affords interaction, our mind gets ready for that action 
through simulation of our prior experiences. This connection between vision and motor 
simulation has been explored in both neural and behavioral contexts. 
Within the neuroscience literature this connection between vision and motor 
response has been examined using several imaging technologies. Chao and Martin (2000) 
had participants view and name several different images while in an fMRI scanner. These 
stimuli included animals, faces, houses, and tools. The researchers proposed that due to 




category shown that facilitated this connection, viewing and naming tools should lead to 
activation in premotor areas of the brain. Indeed, the researchers received support for 
their hypotheses as viewing tools (versus other objects) led to greater activation of the left 
ventral premotor and left posterior parietal cortices, areas associated with motor response. 
Using positron emission tomography (PET), Grèzes and Decety (2002) show similar 
results. The researchers had participants complete several different tasks while viewing 
images of objects, including determining whether the object was upright or inverted, 
naming the object silently, as well as silently naming the action the object is used for. 
Interestingly, each of these tasks was associated with neural activity within the motor 
areas of the brain. Thus, simply viewing the object led to similar neural activity as using 
the object 
The conclusions from the neuroscience literature on the connection between 
vision and motor response have been additionally supported by behavioral research. One 
of the earlier sets of findings showed that participants were quicker to judge the 
orientation of an object (upright or inverted) if the handle of the object and the hand of 
response were more in alignment (Tucker and Ellis 1998). Specifically, if the object’s 
handle was oriented toward the right hand, the right-hand keypress was significantly 
faster than the left-hand keypress. The researchers propose that mental simulation of the 
motor response leads to this quickened response time as the mind is ready for interaction. 
This paradigm was also used to explore motor simulation of abstract objects as well 
(Symes, Ellis, and Tucker 2007). Again, if the orientation of the abstract object 




Additional research has shown that not only the orientation of the object, but also 
the size of the object plays a role in simulated motor response (Tucker and Ellis 2001). In 
one experiment, participants were instructed to distinguish whether an item presented was 
natural or manufactured. Participants were to indicate their responses by pressing one of 
two buttons held in their hand. One of the buttons was pressed by using the index finger 
and thumb (precision grasp – such as that used to hold a small marble), while the other 
button was pushed by using the other three fingers and palm of the hand (power grasp – 
such as when one holds a baseball bat). The items presented varied in size, but were those 
that could be either held with a precision grasp (e.g., grape) or a power grasp (e.g., 
banana). One key finding from the study was an interaction between object size and the 
grasp used for response. Specifically, when participants viewed larger objects, they were 
quicker to categorize with the power grasp than the precision grasp. Conversely, when 
small objects were presented, participants were quicker to categorize with the precision 
grasp than the power grasp. These findings provide behavioral support for the connection 
between vision and motor response.   
Based on the literature reviewed, it appears that visual stimuli (e.g., products) can 
result in mental simulation of motor activity (e.g., interacting with the product). The 
ability to imagine behavioral scenarios has been shown to have a large impact on 
intentions to perform such behaviors (Anderson 1983; Gregory et al. 1982; Schlosser 





H1:  Visual Depiction Effect: Visual stimuli depicting a product which 
facilitate more (vs. less) mental interaction with the product (more mental 
simulation) will result in higher (vs. lower) behavioral intentions. 
 
The visual depiction effect suggests that some visual depictions are more able to 
allow the observer to mentally simulate picking up and interacting with the product than 
others, thereby increasing purchase intentions.  
Demonstrating Process—Impeding Mental Simulation by Perceptual Limitations. 
We examine the impact of occupying perceptual resources on reducing the ability to 
mentally simulate. The connection between perception and cognition is so direct that they 
often compete for the same resources. Indeed, recent research has established similar 
neural activity for perception and imagination (Kosslyn, Ganis, and Thompson 2001; 
Simmons et al. 2005; Zatorre et al. 1996). Unnava, Agarwal, and Haugtvedt (1996) 
provide behavioral evidence for the competition between visual imagery and visual 
perception, as well as auditory imagery and auditory perception. Specifically, when ads 
were presented visually (auditorily), participants were worse at remembering information 
that elicited visual (auditory) imagery during the presentation of the message. The 
perception of the sensory information competed with the ability to imagine, leaving fewer 
resources for remembering.  
Recent research also shows that blocking the ability to perceive has consequences 
on cognition. One set of studies (Oberman, Winkielman, and Ramachandran 2007) 
demonstrates this by using the fact that mimicry is purported to be a key component in 




(2007) had participants bite a pen, thereby activating the facial musculature used during 
smiling (zygomaticus major). This activation of the musculature reduced participants’ 
ability to mimic facial expressions (they cannot smile if they are biting a pen), 
particularly smiling expressions. Consequently, participants were worse at recognizing 
happy faces when biting the pen than when not biting the pen.  
More recently, Havas and colleagues (2010) show that similar restrictions on 
facial activity inhibit related cognitive activity. Participants in the study were Botox 
patients who received injections in their brow to remove frown lines, effectively 
paralyzing the musculature used in furrowing one’s brow. The study was conducted with 
two conditions—one experimental condition prior to the treatment and one two weeks 
after. Participants in the study were given a series of sentences containing various 
emotions and were told to indicate when they understood the sentence. Participants were 
significantly slower to understand angry and sad sentences after the Botox treatment than 
before, as they were not able to generate the facial expressions used corresponding to 
those emotions. These results provide further behavioral support for the link between 
perceptual activity and cognition. Rauscher, Krauss, and Chen (1996) show that 
restricting the ability to make physical gestures when recounting a scene with spatial 
dimensions impairs participants’ ability to describe the scene.  
The prior literature suggests that if one occupies perceptual resources 
corresponding to those used in mental simulation, it will attenuate the effects of visual 






H2:  Impeding mental simulation by occupying perceptual resources will 
attenuate the visual depiction effects on behavioral intentions. 
 
Automaticity of Process. We also examine the extent to which consequences from 
mental simulation differ from more deliberate forms of mental imagery. As mentioned 
earlier, theories of grounded cognition claim that while imagery is a directed form of 
mental simulation, other types of mental simulation occur at a more automatic level, 
outside of working memory (Barsalou 2008). We anticipate that the difference of 
alternate visual product depiction on purchase intention will be larger with automatic 
mental simulation than with direct instructions to imagine interacting with the product. 
This is purported to be the case as individuals imagining interaction with the product 
should be able to mentally pick up and rotate the object, such that the initial depiction and 
orientation is of less importance. We propose that: 
 
H3:  Instructions to imagine using the product depicted will attenuate the 
impact of alternate visual product depiction on behavioral intentions.  
 
Valence of Stimuli.  For a negative or aversive experience, the ability to mentally 
simulate the experience should make it more negative, and result in more negative 





H4:  Visual stimuli (depicting a product) which facilitate more (vs. less) mental 
simulation will result in lower behavioral intentions when the valence of 
the stimulus is negative. 
 
Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework, as well as a brief overview of the 
contribution each experiment makes to the proposed model. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about Here] 
 
Studies 1a and 1b establish the basic visual depiction effect. This basic effect (H1) 
is also tested in the other three studies. Study 2 provides support for the proposed mental 
simulation by imposing perceptual constraints (testing H2). In study 3, we demonstrate 
the difference between the more automatic form of mental simulation and the more 
deliberate form of imagery, testing hypothesis 3. Finally, in study 4, we test that the 
visual depiction effect will be reversed for negatively valenced stimuli (H4).  
 
Study 1: Testing the Basic Visual Depiction Effect 
Study 1a: Yogurt 
 
Overview and Method 
 
Study 1a tests our basic hypothesis (H1) that visual stimuli depicting a product 




purchase intentions. Our stimuli were images of a bowl of yogurt with a headline reading 
“Smooth Vanilla Yogurt” (see figure 3.2). Two versions of the stimulus feature a spoon 
either on the right or the left side of the bowl. The inclusion of the spoon was meant to 
facilitate mental simulation. We created the two versions of the experimental stimuli 
(spoon on left/right) by simply flipping the image over a vertical axis using photo-
manipulation software. We additionally included a control condition wherein the spoon 
was removed. Thus, in total there were three versions of the stimulus to give us a simple 
one-factor design with object orientation as the manipulated independent variable.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.2 about Here] 
 
One hundred and twenty-one participants were recruited to complete the study 
from an online survey panel. Participants in the survey were told that they would be 
evaluating products, and were then presented with the image of the yogurt bowl. 
Participants were told to view the image for as long as they desired before proceeding to 
the questions regarding the product. Our dependent variable was the participants’ 
likelihood of purchasing the yogurt. Specifically we asked participants “How likely 
would you be to purchase this yogurt?” (1 = “Not at all Likely”, 7 = “Very Likely”). 
Participants also indicated their gender, as well as their handedness for eating (right or 
left). After answering the questions, participants were thanked for their time and 





Results and Discussion 
 
Handedness of the participants is a key individual difference variable which can 
affect our results. A match between spoon orientation and handedness (right- or left-) 
should facilitate mental simulation more than a mismatch. That is, if the orientation was 
directed to the right, and the participant was right-handed (coded as a match; similarly 
done for left-orientation of spoon and left-handedness) mental simulation should be 
facilitated. This coding procedure is followed prior to analysis in all subsequent studies.  
Our main hypothesis (H1) is that the orientation of the spoon handle will 
influence the participant’s behavioral (i.e., purchase) intentions. As such, our analysis 
focused on the participant’s stated purchase intentions for the yogurt. We conducted a 
one-way ANOVA with purchase intentions as the dependent variable and match of 
orientation as the independent variable. [We also included gender as a covariate; 
however, it was not significant here nor in any of the subsequent studies, and is not 
discussed further].  
Thirteen percent of the subjects were left-handed. We recoded the initial 
orientation independent variable to represent a match, mismatch, or control condition. We 
next conducted a one-way ANOVA with orientation as the independent variable and 
purchase intentions as the dependent variable. This initial omnibus test was significant 
(F(2, 118) = 3.43, p < .05), and we proceeded to explore our planned contrasts. Our 
initial hypothesis maintains that visual stimuli that facilitate more (vs. less) mental 
simulation will result in higher (vs. lower) purchase intentions. The first set of planned 




hypothesized, when the spoon orientation matched the participant’s dominant hand, 
purchase intentions were significantly higher than when the orientation did not match 
(Mmatch = 5.76, Mmismatch = 4.70; F(1, 118) = 4.20, p < .05).  
The control condition allows us to gauge whether the match between orientation 
and handedness increases purchase intentions, or whether the mismatch decreased 
purchase intentions. Additionally, the inclusion of an instrument to facilitate mental 
simulation allows us to provide support for mental simulation. Should the results follow 
from a mental simulation account, removing the instrument that facilitates mental 
simulation should attenuate the impact of initial orientation on purchase intentions. Thus, 
the match condition should lead to higher purchase intentions than the control condition. 
Additionally, there should not be a significant difference between the mismatch and 
control conditions as mental simulation is not facilitated. Two planned contrasts 
supplement the initial findings. In exploring the difference between the match and control 
conditions, we find that as predicted, purchase intentions for the yogurt are significantly 
higher when the orientation of the spoon matches the participant’s dominant hand than 
when the spoon is removed (Mmatch = 5.76, Mcontrol = 4.45; F(1, 118) = 6.20, p < .05). A 
separate contrast was conducted to explore the difference between the mismatch and 
control conditions. As hypothesized, there is no significant difference between the 
mismatch and control conditions (Mmismatch = 4.70, Mcontrol = 4.45; F(1, 118) = .37, p > 
.10) for stated purchase intentions.  
 





Study 1b was designed to replicate the findings from study 1a within a different 
product category. The stimuli featured a hamburger with a right hand, left hand, or no 
hand holding the hamburger (see figure 3.3).  
 
[Insert Figure 3.3 about Here] 
 
Method and Results 
 
Ninety-five undergraduate students participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. The procedure and measures were identical to those employed in study 1a. 
As in study 1a, the initial orientation independent variable was recoded as a match, 
mismatch, or control condition (depending on handedness). A one-way ANOVA with 
orientation as the independent variable and purchase intentions as the dependent variable 
revealed a significant difference between the means (F(2, 92) = 5.20, p < .01). Planned 
contrasts show that the match condition led to significantly higher purchase intentions 
than the mismatch condition (Mmatch = 4.63, Mmismatch = 3.06; F(1, 92) = 9.00, p < .01), 
replicating the findings from study 1a and providing additional support for hypothesis 1.  
The match condition led to significantly higher purchase intentions than the 
control condition (Mmatch = 4.63, Mcontrol = 3.30; F(1, 92) = 6.55, p < .05), and there was 
no significant difference between the mismatch and control conditions (Mmismatch = 3.06, 







The results from studies 1a and 1b are indicative of a mental simulation account. 
Visual depictions that facilitate more mental simulation lead to higher purchase intentions 
than those which facilitate less mental simulation. The inclusion of control conditions 
provided further support for this proposed process—removing the instrument to facilitate 
mental simulation (spoon in study 1a and hand in study 1b) had similar consequences as 
orienting the product toward the participant’s non-dominant hand. Understanding this 
effect of the instrument to facilitate mental simulation is key as it explains the process for 
the effect and moves the findings beyond the effect of orientation. It is not “orientation” 
per se which results in our effects, but whether a particular visual depiction (which can be 
a particular orientation) facilitates mental simulation.  
 




With study 2, we test hypothesis 2 that impeding mental simulation by occupying 
perceptual resources will limit the impact of the visual depiction effect on purchase 
intentions. Support for hypothesis 2 will further back our mental simulation account for 
the visual depiction effect. Since prior literature has shown that cognition and perception 
utilize similar resources (Kosslyn et al. 2001; Oberman et al. 2007; Simmons et al. 2005; 




to those used in mental simulation should attenuate the effects of visual product depiction 
on purchase intentions (H2). As our operationalization of mental simulation involves 
motor activity with the hands, occupying participants’ hands should attenuate the effects 




For this study, we took a food item (cake) and created an advertisement with a 
fork either on the left or right side of the plate. The advertisement contained a short 
headline “Serving Happiness” and an accompanying logo (see figure 3.4).  
 
[Insert Figure 3.4 about Here] 
 
The key manipulation in this experiment was to block mental simulation by 
engaging participants’ perceptual resources, or more specifically, engaging their hands. 
Importantly, we needed to engage these perceptual resources without participants 
guessing the hypotheses, or becoming overly inquisitive while participating in the study. 
We selected a physical object for participants to hold in their hand while viewing the 
advertisement. This item was a spring-loaded clamp used to hold objects together. The 
clamp was small enough to fit in a participant’s hand, and did not require excessive 
strength to open. We selected this object to ensure that participants would be actively 




We employ four conditions in which participants’ physical resources are active, 
which we propose will differentially impact the ability to mentally simulate interaction 
with the depicted product. In the control condition, participants were not required to hold 
anything in their hands, which simply replicates the procedure from our prior studies. The 
three remaining conditions require participants to hold a clamp either in their non-
dominant hand, their dominant hand, or a clamp in both hands.  
Predictions. Our results to this point suggest that without occupying physical 
resources, participants simulate with their dominant hand. Thus, a clamp in the non-
dominant hand should not change the results much and we predict a replication of the 
basic visual depiction effects, such that the match condition should lead to higher 
purchase intentions than the mismatch condition.  
However, when participants hold the clamp in their dominant hand, the ability to 
simulate with one’s dominant hand is blocked. Thus, we should expect an attenuation of 
the basic visual depiction effect of orientation on purchase intentions. Indeed, it is 
possible that holding the clamp in one’s dominant hand increases simulation with the 
non-dominant hand. Therefore, the mismatch condition where the fork is orientated 
toward the participant’s non-dominant hand may become a temporary match condition, 
and drive a reversal of the basic visual depiction effect.  
Finally, when participants are holding a clamp in both hands, we predict that the 
ability to mentally simulate interaction with either hand is blocked, leading to an 
attenuation of the difference between match and mismatch conditions.  
Three-hundred and twenty-one undergraduate students participated in the study in 




x 4 (simulation block: none, dominant hand, non-dominant hand, both hands) between 
subjects. The study was described as examining physical endurance, so as to not unduly 
surprise participants with our manipulation of holding the clamp. Participants were seated 
in front of a computer with at least one clamp placed on the left side of the computer. The 
initial screen presented to participants on the computer instructed them that they would 
be participating in an experiment exploring the impact of distraction on physical 
endurance. In all conditions participants were instructed that they would be viewing a 
series of advertisements which would advance on their own after five seconds. They were 
to view the advertisements and then answer questions about the advertisements, as well 
as about the physical endurance task.  
Per the condition that the participants were in, they were told to either pick up the 
clamp with their dominant hand, non-dominant hand, pick up one clamp in each hand, or 
were told to place their hands flat on the desk (no simulation block). To coincide with the 
physical endurance cover story, participants were additionally instructed to squeeze the 
clamp such that one inch was visible between the tips of the clamps. This action required 
a modest exertion of effort. Participants viewed four advertisements, which advanced on 
their own. The target advertisement always came third in sequence (the other three 
advertisements were immaterial). Following the advertisements, participants were 
instructed to place the clamps back in their original location and proceed to answer the 
questions about the advertisements. Participants first answered questions regarding the 
cake advertised, and next answered several questions about themselves, including 
demographics and individual difference scales. Upon completion of the target 




clamp and squeeze it until one inch was between the tips. Next, all participants answered 




As in the prior studies, participants first rated the likelihood of purchasing the 
advertised cake (1 = “Not at all Likely”, 9 = “Very Likely”). In order to ensure that our 
simulation block manipulations did not alter participants’ affective state in any systematic 
manner, we also administered the 20-item PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 
1988). Following the scale, participants also reported their handedness and gender. In 
order to maintain the cover story, all participants also answered questions regarding how 




We first examined any potential effects of the tasks on affective measures. 
Separate 2 x 4 ANOVAs with the positive and negative dimensions of the PANAS scale 
as dependent variables revealed neither significant main effects nor any significant 
interactions between orientation and simulation blocking conditions.  
Of the 321 participants, 34 (11%) were left-handed. As in studies 1a and 1b, 
handedness and (fork) orientation together determined whether subjects were in a match 
or mismatch condition. Our key hypothesis is with regards to the interaction between 




4 ANOVA, with orientation and simulation blocking as the independent variables, and 
purchase intentions as the dependent variable. Neither the main effect of orientation, nor 
the main effect of simulation blocking was significant. Importantly, the interaction 
between the two factors was significant (F(3, 313) = 4.73, p < . 05). Figure 3.5 
graphically presents the means. Planned follow-up contrasts reveal the predicted patterns 
of results.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.5 about Here] 
 
An initial simple effects test within the control condition shows a replication of 
our prior results, such that a match between orientation and handedness led to 
significantly higher purchase intentions than a mismatch (Mmatch = 4.55, Mmismatch = 3.37; 
F(1, 313) = 4.88, p < .05). Within the non-dominant simulation blocking condition, as 
predicted, the match condition led to significantly higher purchase intentions than the 
mismatch condition, replicating prior results (Mmatch = 4.43, Mmismatch = 3.62; F(1, 313) = 
4.16, p < .05). This result suggests that simply holding the clamp in one’s hand does not 
block overall mental simulation of motor activity. It may block simulation of the motor 
activity where the physical resources are occupied (e.g., the non-dominant hand), which 
is explored further in our other blocking condition, as described below. 
We find a complete reversal of the basic visual depiction effect in the dominant-
hand simulation block condition when compared with no the simulation block and non-
dominant hand conditions. Specifically, we find that purchase intentions for the cake are 




Mmismatch = 4.83, F(1, 313) = 5.62, p < .05). These results, though not entirely unexpected, 
are surprising given their magnitude. The results suggest that when the dominant hand is 
physically engaged, participants are simulating with their non-dominant hand as it is the 
hand that is free.  
The final simulation block condition is where participants hold one clamp in both 
hands. The results are supportive of our prediction that there will be no significant 
difference in purchase intentions between the match and mismatch orientation conditions 




The results from study 2 are largely supportive of our hypotheses (H1 and H2). 
We find support for our process explanation of mental simulation driving the effect of 
visual product depiction on purchase intention. As perceptual resources are occupied 
through a physical task, the resources used to mentally simulate the interaction are not 
available, affecting the visual depiction effect obtained in earlier studies. Specifically, 
when participants have their dominant hand available, the corresponding visual product 
depiction leads to higher purchase intentions; however, when the dominant hand is 
occupied, the effects are reversed. Additionally, when perceptual resources are occupied 
for both hands, we see an attenuation of the effects of visual product depiction on 
purchase intentions. Study 2 provides unique behavioral support for the mental 
simulation-perception link. In sum, perceptual activity has consequences on mental 




Study 2 demonstrates the grounded nature of mental simulation, such that 
perception and cognition are not independent. This connection in the present context 
leads to consequences on behavioral intentions. While study 2 points to the connection 
between mental simulation and physical perception, in the next study, we focus on the 
difference between mental simulation and imagery. 
 
Study 3: Automatic versus Controlled Imagery (Hammer) 
 
Overview and Method 
 
In this study, we test whether the effects of visual product depiction on mental 
simulation obtained in our earlier studies are more automatic than other forms of imagery 
(we test H3). We anticipate that instructions to fully imagine interacting with the stimulus 
should attenuate the basic visual depiction effect, since given instructions to imagine, 
individuals can mentally pick up and rotate the object, and the initial orientation of the 
object should be of less importance.  
To test for the robustness of the visual depiction effect, in study 3 we use the 
picture of a hammer which is oriented either 45 degrees counterclockwise or 45 degrees 
clockwise from perpendicular (see figure 3.6). An orientation 45 degrees 
counterclockwise from perpendicular would be a match between orientation and 
handedness for right-handed participants. Likewise, an orientation 45 degrees clockwise 





[Insert Figure 3.6 about Here] 
 
Study 3 uses a 2 (product orientation: 45 degrees clockwise or counterclockwise 
from perpendicular) x 2 (imagine instructions: yes or no) between subjects design. Sixty-
nine undergraduates participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The 
procedure for study 3 follows closely that employed in the prior studies. Participants in 
the no imagine instructions conditions were told to view the product for as long as they 
wished before proceeding to answer the questions. Participants in the imagine condition 
were told, “For the product on the following page, we would like you to IMAGINE using 
the product for its intended use.” They were also told to view the object for as long as 
they wished. Participants then viewed the object (the hammer) in one of the two 
orientations and then answered questions regarding the hammer and about themselves. 




As in the prior studies, we recoded the initial orientation of the product to 
represent a match or mismatch with the participant’s dominant hand. We next conducted 
a 2 x 2 ANOVA with orientation and imagery instructions as the independent variables 
and purchase intentions as the dependent variable. Resulting from this analysis is a 
significant main effect of orientation, with the match condition leading to significantly 
higher purchase intentions than the mismatch condition (Mmatch = 5.29, Mmismatch = 4.68; 




interaction between orientation and imagery instructions (F(1, 64) = 4.46, p < .05). The 
main effect of imagery instructions was not significant (p > .10). We anticipated the 
effects of visual product depiction on purchase intentions to be attenuated in the presence 
of controlled imagery instructions. As such, we should replicate our findings from the 
prior studies when no imagining instructions are present. However, when participants are 
instructed to imagine, the orientation of the product should make little difference in 
purchase intentions. Indeed, this is what we find. Follow up contrasts reveal that when 
participants are not given instructions to imagine using the hammer, the match condition 
leads to significantly higher purchase intentions than the mismatch condition (Mmatch = 
5.74, Mmismatch = 4.53; F(1, 65) = 9.35, p < .01). When participants are instructed to 
imagine, there is no significant difference in purchase intentions between the orientation 
conditions (Mmatch = 4.84, Mmismatch = 4.81; F(1, 65) = .01, p > .5). 
While not hypothesized, another result we obtain is that mental simulation (no 
instructions to imagine—implicit imagery) may increase purchase intention to a larger 
extent than more deliberate forms of imagery (direct instruction to imagine interaction 
with the product—explicit imagery). In the match condition, we note that purchase 
intentions are significantly higher with no instructions than with (Mno instructions = 5.74 vs. 
Minstructions = 4.84; F(1, 65) = 5.85, p < .05); there is no significant difference in the 
mismatch condition where automatic imagery may be more difficult (Mno instructions = 4.53 







 As mentioned earlier, theories of grounded cognition claim that while imagery is 
a directed form of mental simulation, other types of mental simulation occur at a much 
more automatic level, outside of working memory (Barsalou 2008). Whether this 
distinction between more automatic and controlled forms of mental simulation exists 
remains an open question (Kent and Lamberts 2008; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). 
Results of study 3 are supportive of this automatic form of mental simulation—
automatic simulation is easier with the dominant hand, but not with the non-dominant 
which needs more deliberate instructions to imagine using it. In study 4, we test whether 
the basic visual depiction effect is reversed for negatively valenced stimuli (H4). 
 




The results of the prior three studies are supportive of a mental simulation 
process. However, one potential alternative explanation to this point would be that the 
visual product depiction is simply easier to process, or more fluent, as it is familiar. 
Although the findings from study 2, in which the connection between perceptual activity 
and mental simulation is shown, does much to rule out this perceptual fluency account, 
study 4 is designed to disentangle the two models further and explicate the process 
underlying the results obtained thus far. We do this by introducing stimulus valence. 
Prior research has shown perceptual fluency to have a purely positive effect on a stimulus 




valence of the stimulus, making a positive stimulus more positive, and a negative 
stimulus more negative (Kisielius and Sternthal 1984, 1986).  
We created two sets of visual stimuli, one positively valenced, and one negatively 




The pretest was conducted to ensure that proper manipulations of valence were 
selected. Sixty-six participants from the same population as the main study were 
administered the pretest. Participants were told that they would be rating food items on 
several different dimensions. These food items were four different soups (cottage cheese 
and tomato soup, cottage cheese and ketchup soup, asiago cheese and tomato soup, and 
cheddar cheese and tomato soup). Attitudes toward the soups were rated on nine-point 
scales (1= Strongly Dislike, 9 = Strongly Like). Of the four soups, attitudes were lowest 
for cottage cheese and ketchup soup (M = 1.89), next lowest for cottage cheese and 
tomato soup (M = 3.50), and identical for asiago cheese and tomato soup and cheddar 
cheese and tomato soup (M = 5.70). We chose asiago cheese and tomato soup as the 
positively valenced stimulus. Although cottage cheese and ketchup soup had the lowest 
overall ratings, we chose cottage cheese and tomato soup for the negatively valenced 
stimulus to reduce the possibility of floor effects (i.e., the stimulus being too negative). 







The stimuli for study 4 were created by taking an image of a bowl tomato soup 
with a spoon on one side and flipping it over a vertical axis to create two mirror images 
of the soup. Thus, as in study 1a, the spoon was either on the right or left side of the 
bowl. To manipulate the valence of the soup, we included a verbal headline for the 
image, as well as a short description of the soup. The only difference within the verbal 
copy was the name of the cheese, with cottage cheese for the negatively valenced 
stimulus and asiago cheese for the positively valenced stimulus. Versions of the stimuli 
are contained within the appendix (see figure 3.7). The design for study 4 is thus a 2 
(orientation: match, mismatch) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) between subjects 
factorial design.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.7 about Here] 
 
One hundred and fifty eight participants were recruited to complete the study 
from an online survey panel. Participants were told that they would be evaluating a 
proposed food item from a restaurant menu. They were instructed to view the image for 
as long as they wished before proceeding to answer questions about the soup. Participants 
next rated their likelihood of purchasing the soup in a manner identical to the prior 
studies. Finally, participants indicated their handedness and were asked to recall which 




asked to guess the purpose of the experiment. No participant showed insight into the 




Of the 158 participants, 19 (12%) were left-handed. The data was recoded as in 
the prior studies to represent a match or mismatch between the participant’s handedness 
and orientation of the spoon.  
An ANOVA was conducted with orientation and valence as the independent 
variables, and purchase intentions as the dependent variable. A representation of the 
means is shown in figure 3.8. The main effect of orientation is not significant (p > .5). 
However, as expected, we do get a main effect of valence (F(1, 154) = 38.22, p < .001). 
An examination of the means shows purchase intentions to be higher for the positively 
valenced soup than the negatively valenced soup (Mpositive = 5.91, Mnegative = 3.52).  
 
[Insert Figure 3.8 about Here] 
 
Of greater importance, we also get a significant interaction between orientation 
and valence on purchase intentions (F(1, 154) = 8.84, p < .005). Planned follow-up 
contrasts reveal that within the positively valenced condition, the match condition leads 
to significantly higher purchase intentions than the mismatch condition (Mmatch = 6.59, 
Mmismatch = 5.33, F(1, 154) = 4.93, p < .05). These results represent a replication from the 




simulation lead to higher purchase intentions, supporting hypothesis 1. Per hypothesis 4, 
when the stimuli are negatively valenced, we should see a reversal of this effect. Indeed, 
supportive of hypothesis 4, we find that within the negatively valenced condition the 
match condition leads to significantly lower purchase intentions than the mismatch 




The findings of study 4 establish boundary conditions to the prior results, but 
more importantly help to explicate the process underlying our results. Specifically, the 
results of study 4 provide further support for our mental simulation account as opposed to 
purely a fluency account, as fluency would predict an increase in purchase intentions for 
both the positive and negative stimuli given a match between orientation and handedness. 
As simulation of a negative experience is facilitated by visual product depictions, the 




Recent models of cognition suggest a considerable amount of overlap between 
perceptual and imagined activity, as it relates to the senses (Barsalou 1999, 2008; Gibbs 
2006; Wilson 2002). A primary objective of this paper is to extend this research by 
examining the interplay between cognition and perception as it relates to visual product 




mental simulation, with significant behavioral consequences. Specifically, we show that 
even the subtle manipulation of orienting an object toward a participant’s dominant hand 
leads to heightened purchase intentions. We claim that this effect is due to the facilitation 
of mental simulation of interacting with the object.  
Four experiments support our claim that visual product depictions can facilitate 
mental simulation, with consequences on consumers’ purchase intention. Studies 1a and 
1b demonstrate the basic visual depiction effect across two different categories—simply 
altering the direction of a spoon or hand affects purchase intentions. As the control 
condition is not significantly different from the mismatch condition, the results from 
studies 1a and 1b show that a match between orientation of the product and the 
individual’s dominant hand increases purchase intentions (as opposed to a mismatch 
condition decreasing purchase intentions).  
The results from study 2 explicate the process by exhibiting the connection 
between impeding perceptual activity and mental simulation. Specifically, we had four 
conditions where perceptual resources were differentially engaged, including conditions 
where participants held a clamp in their dominant hand, non-dominant hand, both hands, 
or did not hold a clamp. When the clamp was held in the participant’s non-dominant 
hand, a match between visual product depiction and handedness led to higher purchase 
intentions than a mismatch. Intriguingly, when the clamp was held in the participant’s 
dominant hand we obtain the reverse effects, such that a mismatch between visual 
product depiction and handedness led to significantly higher purchase intentions than a 
match. Finally, we anticipated and found that occupying the perceptual resources of both 




These results contribute to the behavioral literature exploring the connection between 
cognition and sensory perception.  
In study 3, we examine whether our proposed process of mental simulation has 
different consequences from a more deliberate form of mental imagery. We find that it 
does—automatic mental simulation occurs with the dominant hand, but not with the non-
dominant hand, which needs more deliberate instructions to imagine using it. As such, the 
visual depiction effect is attenuated with deliberate imagery—deliberate imagery 
facilitates mental product interaction to more similar extents with these alternate 
depictions compared to more automatic imagery.  
Should mental simulation underlie our results, a negative experience should 
become more aversive. Study 4 results are consistent with this logic. Study 4 also 
provides additional evidence that fluency does not explain our results. If fluency 
underlies our results, a negative experience should become more positive, as perceptual 
fluency has a hedonically positive effect, irrespective of stimuli valence.  
Managerial implications of this research follow directly from our results. In 
several of the studies we have used advertisements as the primary stimuli. Our results 
suggest that advertisers can increase purchase intentions by facilitating mental simulation 
through their visual depictions of the product. One way to do this is by simply orienting 
the product (e.g., a cup with a handle) toward the right. While this may alienate a small 
percentage of left-handed individuals, the impact on right-handed individuals should 
overwhelm this effect.  
Many other such orientations can encourage mental simulation. For example, 




consumer should facilitate mental simulation of interacting with the slippers. Similarly, 
having the bottle top off of a soda, opening the driver’s door in a car advertisement, or 
folding down the sheets of the side of a bed positioned toward the consumer are all very 
subtle ways of facilitating consumer mental simulation.  
These results are also informative for shelf display in retail environments. For 
example, a very slight change in display of the mugs at the front of a coffee shop may 
have a significant impact on purchases, as consumers simulate grasping them to a greater 
extent.  
Including an instrument that facilitates mental simulation should have similar 
consequences on purchase intentions as orienting the visual depiction. As shown in 
studies 1a and 1b, the lack of an instrument that facilitates mental simulation (e.g., spoon) 
reduces the impact of the visual depiction on purchase intentions. Examples of other 
instruments to facilitate mental simulation include handles on products like bottles, mugs, 
and containers, or even hands interacting with the product. These consequences of visual 
depiction impact not just advertising, but product packaging as well, and designers should 
focus on incorporating these instruments of simulation in the outer package design.  
While significant strides have been made in explicating the consequences of 
deliberate imagery on consumer behavior (for a review see Petrova and Cialdini 2008), 
the more automatic form of mental simulation warrants further attention. Study 3 
suggests that implicit imagery may have a stronger impact on purchase behavior than 
explicit imagery. More research can be done here to explicate when and how mental 




Another theoretical avenue to pursue is the interplay between simulated 
experience and current product experience. Prior literature within sensory experience and 
consumer psychology has shown that sensory experiences can be altered through 
cognitions generated both before (Allison and Uhl 1964; Elder and Krishna 2010; Hoegg 
and Alba 2007; Lee, Frederick, and Ariely 2006; Levin and Gaeth 1988) and after 
(Braunn 1999) exposure to the stimuli. However, the prior literature has explored this 
connection at a deliberate level, with the information coming from external sources. 
Within the present context, mental simulations occur due to more automatic processes 
stemming from an individual’s own prior experience. Future research could determine to 
what extent mental simulations are connected to individual direct product experiences or 
to an aggregation of prior experiences. When are specific experiences more likely to be 
simulated? Do these simulations then alter the actual perceptual experience in ways 
similar to externally generated cognitions? The close connection between actual and 
simulated product experience provides rich avenues for future research. Much research 
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With my dissertation I focus on the interplay between cognition and sensory 
perception. Building upon recent models of cognition, I propose and show that our 
cognitions affect sensory perceptions at both deliberate and more automatic levels, with 
important consequences on consumer behavior. The context in which my results are 
shown is directly relevant to marketers; however, the contribution of my dissertation 
extends to cognitive psychology in general.  
Within my dissertation, I explore the impact of visual and verbal information on 
sensory perception within an advertising context. In my first essay, I show how altering 
the amount of sensory information conveyed prior to a consumption experience leads to 
differential cognitions. These cognitions in turn shape the consumption experience, 
ultimately affecting taste perceptions. The results of the series of studies in my first essay 
exhibit that top-down influences can directly impact bottom-up perceptions, or perceptual 
properties of the stimulus (e.g., the food item). They additionally show that the effect of 
advertising goes far beyond the standard pre-purchase attitudes and intentions, and affects 
actual consumption.  
In my second essay, I continue to build upon the relationship between cognition 




advertising to encourage mental simulation or interaction with the product. The results of 
these studies provide compelling support for the connection in resources shared between 
cognition and perception. Additionally, the studies show that advertisements can alter our 
intentions through very subtle manipulations of visual stimuli. The fact that these effects 
differ from those stemming from deliberate imagery warrants future attention.  
Taken as a whole, my dissertation provides a foundational understanding of some 
of the ways marketers can utilize the connection between cognition and sensory 
perception to inform consumer behavior. I also provide empirical evidence to help 
solidify the theoretical framework within a broader context of cognitive psychology. It is 
my aim to continue this exploration and contribute to the development of this exciting 
research arena.  
 
